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This Brief

;-. filed by Appellee in Reply to arguments

raised by Appellant m

e.
i

THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY AWARDING
DEFENDANT
RIGHTS OF VISITATION
WITHOUT
SUPERVISION IN CONTRADICTION TO THE EXPERT
TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE COURT,
The Appellant
r

argues

e recommendations

appointed

expert, Dr. Mercedes Reisingei , oi the children's therapist, Thomas
Harrison.

However, the

i 11

1

1v

when weighing the evidence is the preponderance of evidence.
Reisinger's

report

was

admitted

without

objection

examination and is the preponderance of evidence.
Harrison

testified

treatment

that Appellant

is in need

Dr.

or cross-

Further, Mr.

of

significant

individually and is in need of treatment with his

children conjointly before he should be allowed to visit them
without

supervision.

[Transcript

664]

Mr. Harrison further

testified that he believed there is a potential for danger to the
children if visitation occurred without supervision.

[Transcript

665]
The Appellee argues in his Reply Brief of Appellant and
Cross-Appellee, page 15, that the Court had the opportunity to
observe Kathryn Coats in her testimony and, based upon that
observation,

the

lower

Court

was

justified

in

ignoring

the

preponderance of evidence and awarding the Defendant rights of
visitation without supervision.
The lower Court made a finding that "there is concern
about

the

father's dysfunction

children of this dysfunction."

and the mother

informing the

[Findings of Fact No. 2, pages 2

and 3] However, this issue was addressed by Dr. Mercedes Reisinger
as follows:
The children appear to derive the problems as
outlined as a result of three primary factors:
(1) there are no emotional problems to varying
degrees;
(2) their father has serious
2

personality
problems
which
foster
his
aggressive
insistence
on
changing
the
visitation without resolution of the existing
conflicts. Mr. Coats tends to be disregarding
of the children's needs due to his own strong
emotional
needs.
He
has
difficulty
interacting with them without disclosing too
much information and is unable to remain in
parental control of the interactions.
(3)
their mother's own overly dramatic and overly
reactive personality style with her overly
candid approach in relation to the children
and the conflicts that have existed with their
father in terms of the information which Mrs.
Coats reportedly discussed with the children,
it appears that it reflects her own fears in
relation to her ex-husband.
It seems that
Mrs. Coats' approach towards the children has
occurred as a result of her misrepresentation
of what Mr. Tom Harrison counseled in
combination with her personality style. As a
result of these factors, the children in this
case are being placed in the middle of adult
conflicts which they have inadequate skills
coping with. This exacerbates the children's
emotional problems. [P-14]
And, even after considering the shortcomings of Kathryn
Coats,

Dr.

Reisinger

still

recommends

that

Defendant

have

supervised visitation.
The Appellant argues that now the children reside in
Virginia, the Appellant is only able to see them on an infrequent
occasion and this limited time together is an additional reason to
allow unsupervised visits so that he can attempt to rebuild his
relationship with his children.
Cross-Appellee, page 16]

[Reply Brief of Appellant and

However, since the Appellant only sees

the children on an infrequent occasion, this supports the position

3

that visitation should be supervised, as the Appellant and the
children have not had the opportunity to rebuild a healthy and
positive relationship.

The lower Court made the finding that the

children do have fear toward their father [Findings of Fact, page
2] and Appellant's infrequent visitation clearly does not alleviate
the children's fear.
It is clear that by not following the recommendations of
the experts, the lower Court ignored the statutory standard of
allowing visitation which is in the best interests of the child.
The matter should be remanded with instructions to follow the
recommendations of the experts.
II.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING THE
PLAINTIFF TO REPLACE MR. TOM HARRISON WITH
ANOTHER COUNSELOR AS THE CHILDREN'S COUNSELOR.
The Appellant argues that the lower Court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that another counselor would be more
appropriate.

The Appellant argues that if antagonism existed

between the counselor and the Appellant, a non-productive session
would result.

[Reply Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellant, page

17] Appellant ignores the fact that Mr. Harrison had been treating
the children for almost two years and that Dr. Mercedes Reisinger
recommended that the children should continue therapy with Tom
Harrison.

Both the Appellant and the lower Court failed to take
4

into consideration the best interests of the child and only
considered the interest of the Appellant.

This matter should be

reversed.
III.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING
THAT ALIMONY WOULD TERMINATE TEN YEARS FROM
THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT WHICH WAS JUNE 16,
1992.
The Appellant argues that with the substantial property
award given to the Appellee by the Court together with her age and
earning ability, an award of $240,000 over a ten-year period cannot
be said to be an abuse of discretion.
and Cross-Appellee]

[Reply Brief of Appellant

However, the Appellant ignores the fact that

these parties were married over thirteen years constituting a longterm marriage.

The Appellant's argument also fails to recognize

the Court's decision in Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App.
1992), wherein the Court upheld an award of permanent alimony based
upon a six-year marriage in a factually similar case.
The Appellant further argues that based on Appellee's
remarriage in the summer of 1993, the issue would be moot and not
be subject to appellate review.

However, the Appellee has filed

for an annulment, and pursuant to 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Annotated.
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio.
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made

5

a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
Thus, the issue is not moot and is subject to appellate review.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY VALUING
NORTHRIDGE FURNISHINGS AT $4,500 EVEN THOUGH
THE DEFENDANT TESTIFIED THAT THE VALUE OF SAID
PROPERTY WAS $18,000.
The Appellant argues that based upon the testimony of
Appellee's own appraiser, John Davis, the lower Court was justified
in concluding that the retail value suggested by the Appellant was
only approximately one-fourth of the actual market value that these
items would sell for in a commercial setting.
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, page 21]

[Reply Brief of

However, the lower Court

did not rely upon the testimony of John Davis when making its
ruling on the Northridge property.

The only evidence before the

Court was the testimony of the Appellant valuing the Northridge
furnishings at $18,000 [TR 456] which is clearly the preponderance
of evidence.

The Court was clearly in error by arbitrarily

reducing the amount from $18,000 to $4,500.
reversed

with

instructions

The case should be

that the value of the Northridge

personal property is $18,000.

6

V.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ELIMINATING
TARGET CAPITOL AS AN ASSET EVEN THOUGH THE
PARTIES STIPULATED THAT IT WAS AN ASSET.
The Appellant argues that the lower Court was correct in
completely discarding Target Capitol as a non-existent asset.
However, even though there was no testimony regarding this asset,
the parties agreed that Target Capitol was an asset of the marital
estate and agreed on its value.

[Exhibits D-59 and P-91]

The Court refused to include Target Capitol in the
marital estate, and the case should be reversed on this issue with
instructions to set the value stipulated by the parties and include
Target Capitol as an asset of the marriage which is awarded to
Defendant•
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF TO HER
FATHER WHICH WAS INCURRED DURING THE DIVORCE
PROCEEDINGS TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES, EXPERT
FEES AND TO MAINTAIN THE FAMILY.
The Appellant makes the argument that the Appellee wishes
the Appellant to pay the entire liability to her father and then to
pay her separately for attorney's fees and witness fees which she
claims are due.
cannot be allowed.
page 21]

The Appellant claims that such double-dipping
[Reply Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

However, Appellant mischaracterizes the argument raised
7

in the Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant which specifically
states at pages 42 and 43, that when determining the issue of the
liability owed to Mr. Tuck, the Court must also consider the subsections

of that Brief relating to attorney's fees and costs.

Consequently, Appellee is not double-dipping as the Appellant has
suggested. The Appellant also fails to recognize the argument made
by Appellee in her Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant, pages
42 and 43. Appellee is not making the argument that Mr. Tuck has
a direct claim against Mr. Coats for payment of the Promissory
Notes. Rather, that the lower Court failed to recognize the entire
liability owed by Plaintiff to her father, which was incurred
during the divorce proceedings to pay attorney's fees, Muir v.
Muir, 847 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992), expert witness fees, Peterson
v. Peterson 818 P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991), and to maintain
the family. The Court was clearly in error by failing to recognize
the undisputed liability owed to Mr. Tuck, and the case should be
reversed with instructions to recognize the liability owed to Mr.
Tuck.
VII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD THE
PLAINTIFF ALL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
INCURRED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
The Appellant argues that the Court took into account the
financial need of the receiving spouse and the ability of the other
8

spouse to pay, together with the conduct of both spouses in
generating the fees, and correctly awarded the Appellee only
$20,000 in attorney's fees. However, the Court ignores Martindale
v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-518 (Utah App. 1989) which states that
"where the evidence supporting the reasonableness of the requested
fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed...the court abuses
its discretion in awarding less than the amount requested unless
the reduction is warranted by one or more of the established
factors."

[emphasis added]

the reduction in fees.

The Court offered no explanation for
Because the evidence of Plaintiff's

attorney's fees is adequate and entirely undisputed, the Court
abused its discretion.

All of the fees paid by the Plaintiff's

father and all the fees incurred for the trial should be awarded to
the Plaintiff.
VIII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD THE
PLAINTIFF REASONABLE FEES FOR EXPERTS. I.E..
ACCOUNTANTS. APPRAISERS. ENGINEER AND OTHER
EXPERTS WHO APPEARED ON HER BEHALF AND
ASSISTED
HER
IN
THE
PREPARATION
AND
PRESENTATION OF HER CASE.
The

Appellant

argues

that

the

lower

Court

denied

Appellee's request for expert witness fees on the basis that her
request was overly broad under Utah law. However, this argument is
unsupported by the record. The Judge stated from the bench that he
was not going to award fees because he was not persuaded that
9

Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), applied to
professional experts such as accountants. [TR 506] However, it is
clear that the Court misapplied the holding in Peterson as it
clearly states that Utah Code Annotated. § 30-3-3, "empowers a
court to use its sound discretion to define costs as those
reasonable amounts that are reasonably expended to prosecute or
defend a divorce action."

[emphasis added]

In Rappleve v.

Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993), Mrs. Rappleye sought
reimbursement

of accounting

costs that

had been

incurred in

prosecuting the divorce. The trial Court rejected her claim. The
lower Court's determination was vacated and the matter remanded for
further findings regarding the propriety of awarding accounting
costs to Mrs. Rappleye under Utah Code Annotated. § 30-3-3 (1989).
The Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence
before the Court to justify such fees.

However, the Plaintiff

testified that she incurred expert fees in the case and it was her
desire to be awarded 100% of those expert fees.

[TR 780-781] She

further testified that experts in this case were necessary because
of Defendant's failure to cooperate in discovery, valuation of the
assets, and payment of support.

[TR 778-779] Utah Code Annotated,

§ 30-3-3, requires that fees and costs be awarded pursuant to need
and ability to pay. As such, the statutory requirements of § 30-33 were satisfied, and the lower Court's decision to deny expert
10

fees in this case should be reversed and the Court instructed to
award $14,200 in expert fees.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant has failed to refute any of the arguments
presented to this Court for review.

Consequently, the Court

committed error:
a.
without

supervision

By awarding Defendant rights of visitation
in contradiction

to the expert testimony

presented to the Court.
b.

Directing the Plaintiff to replace Mr. Thomas

Harrison with another counselor as the children's counselor when
Dr. Reisinger recommended that the children continue in therapy
with Mr. Harrison had been treating the children for almost two
years.
c.

Directing that alimony would terminate in ten

years when in fact this marriage constituted a long-term marriage
that should have resulted in an award of permanent alimony.
d.

Valuing the Northridge furnishings at $4,500

even though the only evidence before the Court was Defendant's
testimony that the value of said property was $18,000.
e.

Eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the

marital estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset.
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£•

Failing to recognize the entire liability of

the Plaintiff to her father which was incurred during the divorce
proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and to
maintain the family.
g.

Failing to award the Plaintiff all attorney's

fees and costs incurred in these proceedings.
h.

Failing to award the Plaintiff reasonable fees

for experts, i.e., accountants, engineers, appraisers, and other
experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted

her in the

preparation and presentation of the case.
DATED this

day of April, 1994.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

'JOANNA B. SAGERS
;to^ney for Plaintiff/Appellee

12

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, REPLY BRIEF OF CROSSAPPELLANT, this -2L-T day of April, 1994, to:
Craig S. Cook, Esq.
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

J4\coatB.rep

13

